- discuss potential process improvements to the interviewing process
- review borderline interviews with the group to review together, if your interviewing tool supports recording and playback
- have interviewers read through feedback their candidates got from onsite interviewers and look for consistent patterns.
- Was this statistically significant, or are you conducting pseudoscience? Definitely pseudoscience. Folks in the sample were conducting about 10 interviews a month, ~25 per quarter. Perhaps not yet ready to publish in Nature but meaningful enough to infer from, especially considering the relatively low cost of being wrong.
- Why didn’t the on-site pass rate double, as predicted? First, not all of the top folks ended up joining the team. Second, the best performers did well because of a combination of skill (great interviewers, friendly, high signal) and luck (got better candidates). Luck is fleeting, resulting in a regression to the mean.
- What size does this start to make sense at? Early on, you should just identify who you believe your best interviewers are and have them (or yourself) do all the phone screens. Then, once you start hiring rapidly enough that you are doing about 5-10 phone screens a week, run the numbers and invite your best 2-3 onsite interviewers to join and create the team.
- What did you do for specialized engineering roles? They had their own dedicated processes. Data Science ran a take home, Front-End engineers had their own Phone Screen sub-team, and Data and ML Engineers went through the general full-stack engineer phone screen.
- Didn’t shrinking your Phone Screener pool hurt your diversity? In fact, the opposite happened. First, the phone screener pool had a higher percentage of women than the engineering organization at the time; second, a common interviewing anti-pattern is “hazing” - asking difficult questions and then rejecting somebody for “not even remembering about Kahn’s algorithm, lolz.” The best phone screeners don’t haze, bringing a more diverse group onsite.
- to the edge for things like page views (the server is fine, here, though, if you KISS)
- to the server for events that have consequences, like button presses.
- to publishers for paid traffic conversion, inform Google/Facebook via their server-side APIs when feasible, instead of trying to load a pixel
We explicitly only changed the infra which served our landing pages, and kept the content - the HTML/CSS/JS - identical. Once the new infra was shown to work, we would begin to experiment with the website itself. ↩
- Why didn’t the issue get caught by unit tests?
- Why didn’t the issue get caught by integration/smoke tests?
- Why didn’t the issue get flagged in Code Review?
- Why didn’t the issue get caught during manual QA?
- If the outage took over an hour to get discovered, why didn’t the monitoring page our on-call?
- trade-off we were aware of this concern but explicitly made the speed-vs-quality trade-off (IE, not adding tests for an experiment). This was tech debt coming back to bite us.
- knowledge gap the person doing the work was not aware that this kind of error was even possible (IE, tricky race conditions, worker starvation)
brain fart now that we look at it, we should have caught this earlier. “Just didn’t get enough sleep that night” kind of thing.
If you keep asking “why” but haven’t gotten to an answer that boils down to one of these, keep going deeper (or get a second opinion).
- Inertia. I have a job and a system that “works” for me. Don’t change what isn’t broken.
- Status. I have a “real job” at a “real company.” Working remote is for weirdos and loners.
- Productivity. Real decisions happen in elevators on the way to lunch. We know how to be efficient and innovative in-person. How the hell do you build a team remotely?
- document view
- dealing with arrays
- dealing with nested objects
- boolean fields
- integer fields
- auto-discovery & Schema
- collection (table) view
- home page view
- doesn’t look terrible
- wrapping the admin into a package.
- Open-source maintenance is hard, especially if your only remaining motivation is altruism. Richard Schneeman gave a great talk about Saving Sprockets last year which nailed it.
- Perhaps we should have quit while we were ahead and put an “not actively maintained, looking for maintainers” on the README back in 2014. That would have been a bit more responsible.
- On the bright side, building a key piece of infrastructure for a hip new development framework turned out to be a great way to get a lot of users for your open source project.
- To Greg, the prospect of collaborating with whom kept me in the project as long as it did.
- The Yefim, Ceasar, Matteo, Roger, Sam and other contributors!
- The the Meteor Development Group folks for their contributions to realtime web development, whose ideas will live on independent of Meteor’s future, and also for the free snacks and t-shirts and the Pebbles we won at that hackathon back at 2013.
as far as I know, Meteor still doesn’t have proper Server-Side rendering. Arunoda wrote a community library in 2015, but given the Blaze/React split, I’m uncertain how much of this has come to pass. ↩
Ironically, the closest thing to an Meteor Admin at the time was Genghis, a standalone one-page PHP-based Mongo editor by Justin Hileman, whose younger brother I had somehow hired the year prior. Silicon Valley is a small place. ↩
though it too looks like it has not been updated in 10 months :-/. ↩
“The new VP wants us to double engineering’s headcount in the next six months. If we have a chance in hell to hit the hiring target, you seriously need to reconsider how fussy you’ve become.”
It’s never good to have a recruiter ask engineers to lower their hiring bar, but he had a point. It can take upwards of 100 engineering hours to hire a single candidate, and we had over 50 engineers to hire. Even with the majority of the team chipping in, engineers would often spend multiple hours a week in interviews. Folks began to complain about interview burnout.
Also, fewer people were actually getting offers; the onsite pass rate had fallen by almost a third, from ~40% to under 30%. This meant we needed even more interviews for every hire.
Visnu and I were early engineers bothered most by the state of our hiring process. We dug in. Within a few months, the onsite pass rate went back up, and interviewing burnout receded.
We didn’t lower the hiring bar, though. There was a better way.
Introducing: the Phone Screen Team
We took the company’s best technical interviewers and organized them into a dedicated Phone Screen Team. No longer would engineers be assigned between onsite interviews and preliminary phone screens at recruiting coordinators’ whims. The Phone Screen Team specialized in phone screens; everybody else did onsites.
Why did you think this would be a good idea?
Honestly, all I wanted at the start was to see if I was a higher-signal interviewer than my buddy Joe. So I graphed people’s phone screen pass rate against how those candidates performed in their onsite pass rate.
Joe turned out to be the better interviewer. More importantly, I stumbled into the fact that a number of engineers doing phone screens performed consistently better across the board. They both had more candidates pass their phone screens and then those candidates would get offers at a higher rate.
These numbers were consistent, quarter over quarter. As we compared the top quartile of phone screeners to everybody else, the difference was stark. Each group included a mix of strict and lenient phone screeners; on average, both groups had a phone screen pass rate of 40%.
The similarities ended there: the top quartile’s invitees were twice as likely to get an offer after the onsite (50% vs 25%). These results also were consistent across quarters.
Armed with newfound knowledge of phone screen superforecasters, the obvious move was to have them do all the interviews. In retrospect, it made a ton of sense that some interviewers were “just better” than others.
A quarter after implementing the new process, the “phone screen to onsite” rate stayed constant, but the “onsite pass rate” climbed from ~30% to ~40%, shaving more than 10 hours-per-hire (footnote 2). Opendoor was still running this process when I left several years later.
You should too (footnote 3, footnote 4).
Starting your own Phone Screen Team
1. Identifying Interviewers (footnote 5)
Get your Lever or Greenhouse (or ATS of choice) into an analyzable place somewhere, and then quantify how well interviewers perform. There’s lots of ways to analyze performance; here’s a simple approach which favors folks who generated lots of offers from as few as possible onsites and phone screens.
You can adjust the constants to where zero would match a median interviewer. A score of zero, then, is good.
Your query will look something like this:
|Accurate Alice||20||5||3||(45 - 20 - 20) / 20 = 0.25|
|Friendly Fred||20||9||4||(60 - 36 - 20) / 20 = 0.2|
|Strict Sally||20||4||2||(30 - 16 - 20) / 20 = -0.3|
|Chaotic Chris||20||10||3||(45 - 40 - 20) / 20 = -0.75|
|No Good Nick||20||12||2||(30 - 48 - 20) / 30 = -1.9|
Ideally, hires would also be included in the funnel, since a great phone screen experience would make a candidate more likely to join. I tried including them; unfortunately, the numbers get too small and we start running out of statistical predictive power.
2. Logistics & Scheduling
Phone Screen interviewers no longer do onsite interviews (except as emergency backfills). The questions they ask are now retired from the onsite interview pool to avoid collisions.
Ask the engineers to identify and block off 4 hour-long weekly slots to make available to recruiting (recruiting coordinators will love you). Use a tool like youcanbook.me or calendly to create a unified availability calendar. Aim to have no more than ~2.5 interviews per interviewer per week. To minimize burnout, one thing we tried was to take 2 weeks off interviewing every 6 weeks.
To avoid conflict, ensure that interviewers’ managers are bought in to the time commitment and incorporate their participation during performance reviews.
3. Onboarding Interviewers
When new engineers join the company and start interviewing, they will initially conduct on-site interviews only. If they perform well, consider inviting them into the phone screen team as slots open up. Encourage new members to keep the same question they were already calibrated on, but adapt it to the phone format as needed. In general, it helps to make the question easier and shorter than if you were conducting the interview in person.
When onboarding a new engineer onto the team, have them shadow a current member twice, then be reverse-shadowed by that member twice. Discuss and offer feedback after each shadowing.
4. Continuous Improvement
Interviewing can get repetitive and lonely. Fight this head-on by having recruiting coordinators add a second interviewer (not necessarily from the team) to join 10% or so of interviews and discuss afterwords.
Hold a monthly retrospective with the team and recruiting, with three items on the agenda:
Eventually, interviewers may get burnt out and say things like “I’m interviewing way more people than others on my actual team - why? I could just go do onsite interviews.” This probably means it’s time to rotate them out. Six months feels about right for a typical “phone screen team” tour of duty, to give people a rest. Some folks may not mind and stay on the team for longer.
Buy exclusive swag for team members. Swag are cheap and these people are doing incredibly valuable work. Leaderboards (“Sarah interviewed 10 of the new hires this year”) help raise awareness. Appreciation goes a long way.
Also, people want to be on teams with cool names. Come up with a cooler name than “Phone Screen Team.” My best idea so far is “Ambassadors.”
There’s something very Dunder Mifflin about companies that create Growth Engineering organizations to micro-optimize conversion, only to have those very growth engineers struggle to focus due to interview thrash from an inefficient hiring process. These companies invest millions into hiring, coaching and retaining the very best sales people. Then they leave recruiting - selling the idea of working at the company - in the hands of an engineer that hasn’t gotten a lick of feedback on their interviewing since joining two years ago, with a tight project deadline on the back of her mind.
If you accept the simple truth that not all interviewers are created equal, that the same rigorous quantitative process with which you improve the business should also be used to improve your internal operations, and if you’re trying to hire quickly, you should consider creating a Technical Phone Screen Team.
FAQs, Caveats, and Pre-emptive Defensiveness
I’m here to warn you about the dangers of front-end user tracking. Not because Google is tracking you, but because it doesn’t track you quite well enough.
What follows is a story in three parts: the front-end tracking trap I fell into, how we dug ourselves out, and how you can go around the trap altogether.
Part 1: A Cautionary Tale
The year was 2019. Opendoor was signing my paychecks.
We were launching our shiny new homepage.
We had spent a month migrating our landing pages from the Rails monolith to a shiny new Next.JS app. The new site was way faster and would therefore convert better, saving us millions of dollars annually in Facebook and Google ad costs.
Being responsible, we ran the roll-out as an A/B test, sending half of the traffic to the old site so we could quantify our impact1.
The impact we’d made was making things worse. Way worse. The new site got crushed.
WTF. Google had told us our new page was way better. The new site even felt snappier.
“Figure it out.” The engineers on revamp paired up with a Data Scientist and went to go figure out what the hell was going on. They started digging into every nook and cranny of the relaunch.
A week went by. Our director peeked in curiously. Murmurs about postponing the big launch started to circle. Weight was gained; hair was lost.
Ultimately, the clue that cracked the case was bounces. Bounces (IE, people leaving right away) were way up on the new site. But it was clear the new site loaded much faster. Bounce rates should have gone down, not up.
How did we measure bounce rates? We dug in.
How bounces work
When the homepage loads, the front-end tracking code records a ‘page view’ event. If the ‘page view’ event was recorded, but then nothing else happens, analytics will consider that user to have “bounced”.
It turned out that the old site was so slow that many folks left before their ‘page view’ ever got recorded. In other words, the old site was dramatically under-reporting bounces.
It was like comparing two diet plans and saying the one where half the subjects quit was better because the survivors tended to lose weight.
Part 2: How we fixed bounces
If the front-end was under-reporting bounces, could we find a way to track a ‘page view’ without relying on the client?
There was. It was on the server - though in our example, we tracked the event in Cloudflare, which we were already using for our A/B test setup.
We started logging a
page-about-to-be-viewed event instead of the
page view event, which was really
Lo and behold, the new infra was better after all! We had been giving our old page too much credit this entire time, but nobody was incentivized to cry wolf.
Part 3: Front-end tracking done right
Forsake the front-end. Tis a terrible place to track things, for at least three reasons.
We calculated that getting rid of Segment and Google Tag Manager on our landing pages would yield about 10-15 points of Google PageSpeed. Google takes PageSpeed into account for Quality Score, which in turn makes your CPMs/CPC cheaper.
Somewhere between a half and a quarter of all users have ad-blockers set up. If you’re relying on a pixel event to inform Google / Facebook of conversions, you’re not telling them about everybody. This makes it harder for their machine learning to optimize which customers to send your way. Which means you’re paying more for the same traffic.
What should i do instead?
Take all your client-side tracking, and move it
FAQs & Caveats
Does your approach break identifying & cookie-ing users, so you can retarget effectively?
Shouldn’t. We used Segment to
identify anonymous users; the change was just calling
.identify() in Cloudflare (and handling the user cookie there).
I heard server-side conversion tracking for google and facebook doesn’t perform as well.
I’ve heard (and experienced) this as well. We’re entering black magic territory here… try it.
Want to tell me I’m misinformed / on-point / needed? Hit me up.
“Alexey, do you feel the points you bring up during our post-mortems are productive?” my tech lead asked at our 1:1.
Well, shit. I had thought so, but apparently not.
Earlier in the year, I became the Engineering Manager on a team responsible for half of the outages at our 2,000 person company. After each incident, the on-call engineer would write-up a doc and schedule a meeting.
“How come this wasn’t caught in unit tests?” I found myself asking, in front of the assembled team. Next post-mortem, same thing. “I get that we didn’t have monitoring for this particular metric, but why not?” Week after week.
The tech lead had asked a great question. Was my approach working?
“I want to set high expectations,” I told him. “It’s not pleasant being critiqued in a group setting, but my hope is that the team internalizes my ‘good post-mortem’ bar.”
The words sounded wrong even as I said them.
“Thanks for the feedback.” I said “Let me think on it.”
I thought about it.
There’s a limited budget for criticism one can ingest productively in a single sitting. Managers will try to extend this budget through famed best-practices like the shit-sandwich and the not-really-a-question question. Employees learn these approaches over time and develop an immunity.
This happened here. Once my questioning reached the criticism threshold, I was no longer “improving the post-mortem culture.” I was “building resentment and defensiveness”.
I had run over budget. And yet, there was important feedback to give!
Change the template, change the world
Upon reflection, I ended up updating our post-mortem template. My questions became part of the template that got filled in before meeting.
This way, it was the template pestering the post-mortem author. My role was simply to insist that the template be filled out; an entirely reasonable ask.
Surprisingly enough, this worked; post-mortems became more substantive. The team pared down outage frequency and met OKR goals.
One Simple Trick I had stumbled into was that there was a way to get around feedback budgets. Turns out there’s this other, vaster budget to tap into: the budget of process automation. When feedback is automated, it arrives sooner, feels confidential, and lacks judgement. This makes it palatable; this is why the budget is vaster.
The technical analogy here is how we use linters. “Nit: don’t forget to explicitly handle the return value” during code review feels mildly frustrating. Ugh. It’s “just a style thing” and “the code works”. I’ll make the change, but with slight resentment.
Yet, if that same “unhandled return value” nudge arrives in the form of a linter, it’s a different story. I got the feedback before submitting the code for review; no human had to see my minor incompetence.
As a software engineer, Have Good Linters is an obvious, uncontroversial best practice. The revelatory moment for me was that templates for documents were just another kind of linter.
My insight completely transformed the way Opendoor Engineering thinks about feedback; I crowd-surfed, held aloft by the team’s grateful arms, to receive my due praise as the master of all process improvement.
Just kidding; COVID-19 happened and I switched jobs.
The Appendices Three
I: Process linters seen in the wild
Feedback “we have too many meetings”; “what’s the point of this meeting”; “do I need to be here” Linter mandate no-meetings days; mandate agendas; mandate a hard max on attendee count.
Feedback “Hey, how’s that project going? Haven’t heard from you in a bit” Linter Daily stand-ups (synchronous or in slack/an app); issue trackers (Linear, Asana, Jira, Trello)
Feedback “Hey, a friend who uses the app said that our unsubscribe page is broken?” Linter Quality pre-deploy test coverage, automated error reporting (Sentry), Alerting on pages or business metrics having anomalous activity patterns (Datadog).
II: You’ve gone too far with this process crap
The process budget is vaster than the feedback budget, but it isn’t unlimited. A mature company is going to have lots of legacy process - process debt, if you will.
Process requires maintenance and pruning, to avoid “we do this because we’ve always done this” type problems. High-process managers are just as likely to generate unhappy employees as high-feedback managers.
III: The post-mortem template changes, if that’s what you’re here for
A. “5 Whys” Prompts
Our original 5 Whys prompt was “Why did this outage occur.” During the post-mortem review, I kept asking questions like “but why didn’t this get caught in regression testing?”
So, after discussion, I added my evergreen questions to the post-mortem template. They are:
B. Defining “Root Cause”
“5 Whys” recommends continuing to ask why until you’re about five levels deep. We were often stopping at one or two.
To make stopping less ambiguous, here are a set of “root causes” that I think are close to exhaustive:
Working remotely: not just for COVID-19 anymore.
From academia to the Open Source movement, remote collaboration is not exactly novel. From Github to DuckDuckGo, remote-first successful businesses are no longer rare.
Remote work occupied the cultural relevance of something those whiz kids do, working on a beach in Thailand. Until today.
What has prevented remote work adoption?
COVID-19 addressed inertia. Twitter, a Legitimate Tech Company™️, addressed status. Productivity is still pretty hit-or-miss, but it’s early days yet.
Trust me, I’m an
expert guinea pig
I came to the Bay Area like a moth to the flame of start-ups after college.
Lacking an H-1B, I left in 2014, and started Hacker Paradise, a boutique travel business catered to remote workers. During that time, I worked remotely as a software engineer for an SF client for over a year.
In 2016, I came back to San Francisco. I did it for the same reason I came in the first place - the quality of the jobs and the community.
I don’t love working remotely. I miss the energy I get from a well-run office environment. COVID-19 has taught me that I’m an extrovert, and shelter-in-place has sucked.
Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn’t go away
- Philip K. Dick.
1. Remote work is about to do to San Francisco what San Francisco did to the South Bay.
Techies have been leaving San Francisco for cities like Portland, Austin, Denver and Seattle (PADS) for over a decade. We seek a place to settle down and improve cost-to-quality-of-life ratio.
As it becomes easier than ever to keep your job while moving, this trend will pick up. The microkitchens at Twitter are nice, but not “an extra $2k/mo in rent” nice.
As ambitious millennials realize they can optimize for quality of life, expect businesses like Culdesac and Hacker Paradise (see what I did there) to blossom.
San Francisco will neither be abandoned quickly nor completely. It’ll retain a “city emeritus” status, like London, Philadelphia or Palo Alto.
2. We’re going to learn to run remote organizations.
We are, as an industry, pretty clueless at remote company building.
In fairness, we’re not even that good at regular company building. We just figured out 1:1s were a good idea and are still deciding who dotted-lines to whom in the matrix org structure.
You can’t just slap “remote friendly” on your jobs page and decide you’ve done a “heck of a job.”
Should team sizes change? How to you measure and manage morale? What about onboarding and knowledge sharing?
There’s some knowledge to be gleaned from the Basecamp folks; they wrote a book about remote work. That book is the COBOL of remote work; it works, but we can do better.
3. We’re about to enter a renaissance in remote collaboration tooling.
Slack is doing phenomenally well during COVID-19, but it still kind of sucks, right? At least when people emailed you, they didn’t expect a response right away. Etiquette around Slack usage is still pretty immature, am I right @channel?
Also. Software engineers use Github, and it’s a pretty mature way to collaborate on shared work. Every other industry is still sending around
Presentation Final Final .pdf. Some of my favorite former co-workers are building companies in this space. expect more businesses like Figma and Loom to blossom.
PS. You’re wrong, Alexey. Offices are here to stay.
That’s true. They will.
We tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the short run and underestimate the effect in the long run
- Amara’s Law
The move to remote-as-mainstream-option will take a good decade or two. The inflection point, however, was today, on May 12, 2020.
I for one look forward to kids asking what it was like when I had to leave for work every day.
Create an open source project, they said.
It’ll be great for your resume, they said.
Part 0: Wherein we provide context
The year was 2013, Meteor was the hip new kid on the block and Coffeescript was a reasonable JS dialect choice. We were fresh out of college. Meteor was hosting their first ‘Summer Hackathon’ in San Francisco on 10th and Minna, and we figured this was our shot.
Sequestering ourselves on the second floor of the hackspace, a couple of college friends and I acquired a whiteboard and some markers, and jotted down our big idea list. Not lacking for ambition, the first thing we figured we would fix was server-side rendering. Turned out this seemingly simple task was already on Meteor’s Trello Roadmap, so, what the heck, we figured we’d pitch in.
Speaking with the actual development team a few hours later, we learned that server side was (1) hard and (2) coming soon anyway1. Fair enough - we’d solve our other painpoint, the lack of a proper admin DSL.
Part 1: introducing Z, the Mongo Admin
Coming from Django land, one of my favorite Framework features had always been being able to describe Admin UIs with a very high level DSL - stuff like
leading to auto-generated pages that look like:
Meteor didn’t have an admin DSL2 yet. I wanted very much to build one, and a zero-config one (IE, automatically discover your models) at that. I kept suggesting this idea until the others agreed. Leadership.
We cranked out a desired feature-list on a whiteboard. It looked like this.
Then we got started. I hid in a corner and tried to figure out how to get a list of Collections, and the fields in each collection, out of an arbitrary Meteor app. It turned out there was no official way but if I poked under the covers of the undocumented
It turned out you had to ‘warm up’ the _RemoteCollectionDriver (by creating an arbitrary collection) to get the collections loaded. This was the way things worked around Meteor 0.6.
Package loading was the other relatively painful thing - since we couldn’t figure out quite how to get our package loaded last (since we relied on a router and a number of other packages), Yefim solved the problem the pragmatic Hackathon way, and named the package Z-Meteor Admin. This way, unless we relied on a package that decided to start with two Z’s, Meteor would load us last.
Launching with the MVP
Surprisingly, it kind of worked.
We demoed at the Hackathon and even won the ‘Award for Most Technically Impressive’.
Greg and I kept working on the project throughout the summer and fall of 2013. We cleaned it up and released 1.0 in December 2013, after gaining over 200 stars on Github.
For our 1.0 release, I demoed a slightly-less-hacky-and-now-renamed Houston Admin at Meteor Devshop 10:
Here’s the blog post I wrote to celebrate the event.
Part 2: A primer on gas tank emptying
Between the 1.0 in December 2013 and roughly summer 2014, our enthusiasm for working on the project waned. There were many reasons, but here are some:
1. We had shit to do.
Greg finished school and was working for Gumroad, not in Meteor. I was doing consulting/startup prototyping work, also mostly not in Meteor. Yefim & Ceasar made the wise decision of not doing much contributing work past the initial release.
2. We were no longer scratching our own itch.
Originally, Yefim and I used Houston for the Intern Dinners we were running that summer. It was pretty helpful, and if we needed more UI stuff, we’d just add it. That was summer 2013.
Even though many of the feature requests we were getting were quite sensible (and we implemented a bunch of them), we really weren’t scratching our own itch after summer 2013.
3. ‘How do I even’-esque Github Issues
Actually, having gone through some of the ~270 Github Issues on the project, I’m surprised by how good many of them were and how attentive and friendly we were about them. Still, there were a few bad apples, like css not rendering, how to upload files and Cannot login on Heroku app that either failed to provide enough context and/or were coming from folks who were not otherwise yet competent Meteor (or even JS) developers.
4. Meteor doesn’t support Mounting & hacky CSS.
$('.save').disable() and later the user goes to Houston, all of a sudden all of our ‘save’ buttons are disabled and its unclear why. Likewise, any global CSS rules the parent app chooses to use, like (say) making table columns 200 pixels high, will also make our table columns 200 pixels high. Greg did some crazy things to avoid the namespace collissions.
Django solves this problem through URL namespaces, allowing the ‘admin’ to behave largely like its own app. Express.js allows for ‘mounting’ of multiple sub-apps on certain directory paths - in either case, no shared CSS/JS is bundled for these cases, avoiding collissions like the above.
Meteor did not support Mounting out of the box. I bugged the devs about it at a later Devshop, and got an off-hand note that this was not a priority for now. Later on we tried to add Mounting to Meteor and/or host the Admin as a separate app that shared only the database with the parent app, but by then lacked the enthusiasm to bring the projects to completion.
5. Testing is tough!
Reactive apps with not a ton of business logic are tough to test! Perhaps we simply lacked the experience here, but when Greg and I tried to add proper integration tests to the app, we spent tens of hours being our heads against the wall, time that would have been better spent actually fixing bugs.
6. Router Wars
When we created Houston in summer 2013, there was a router that I believe was just called Router. Later, Iron-Router becames the default router (perhaps this was a rename?) - and even later, Flow-Router became the preferred router. Here’s a post on the state of routing as of Summer 2015.
The point was, you couldn’t really use both routers and so we would need lots of clever work to see if we could support both paths. We discussed this in a Github Issue and I wrote up a prototype but ultimately just didn’t have enough time/energy to ship a supports-both solution.
7. When Undocumented Internal Dependencies Change
_RemoteCollectionDriver hack? In most every release (0.7, 0.8) my ‘whatever, go ask mongo what collections there are’ hack kept breaking and I had to re-implement a new hack based on whichever refactor the Meteor Development Group implemented internally.
Not particularly taxing, but just a drain.
8. We never stepped back and thought about architecture.
Things were in slighly better shape than they were back during the hackathon, but there was never a “how should this package be properly architected” conversation. As a result, in later months as I tried to go back and implement changes, it was never clear to me what was where or why, or what edge cases I would need to consider and support. This made “weekend-a-month” type support less useful over time as I knew the codebase less and less well.
Part 3: Where we go to Costa Rica and try to turn things around
Costa Rica: the plan
Around Summer 2014, a year after we started, things were going kind of slumpey. As an effort to regroup, I invited Greg to Costa Rica where I was staying for a few months:
The plan was basically to unbreak the critical stuff and make a plan for what we wanted to do next, and maybe also play some soccer on the beach.
Costa Rica: what actually happened
I got bogged down on a consulting project that was a bit behind schedule as Greg visited. So we got maybe 1-2 days of work done, which instead of dealing with any of the issues on my part was shipping a new feature I decided I wanted, called Custom Actions, which were kind of cool but not at all the problem.
We still played some soccer, though. Greg was way better at soccer than the rest of us.
Get other maintainers, they said
We had two pretty helpful maintainers turn up: First, Roger decided to redesign our UI from basic boostrap to the line-green version you see today. Second, sometime around late 2014, this Swiss dude named Matteo showed up and fixed a bunch of things. That was awesome, and we talked to him on Skype and gave him write access as somebody had suggested for growing your maintainers.
Later, in 2015, my friend Sam came in and added some proper tests, but development had largely ceased by then.
Still, for whatever reason, nobody stuck around and answered issues, etc, for the long term, so it was still up to us.
Part 4: Decline and Fall of the Houston Admin
Meteor 1.0 is released!
Coinciding with Greg’s visit, Meteor finally released 1.0 in October 2014. Perhaps we’ll no longer have to adjust the incompatible hacks we use to figure out which collections are to be added and we can focus on the good stuff!
Blaze vs React
If only. A year later, the big question up in the air becomes whether to use Meteor’s original Blaze templating or switch to a react-based front-end. React is great and all, but we for one are not up for yet anothe rewrite of this thing we haven’t really gotten to use for our own stuff in like, two years.
Part 5, an Epilogue
Perhaps the most poignant symptom of the sort of stagnancy that the project fell into is that I had an idea to write this blog-post in early 2015, and it took two years to even get the post-mortem for this project done.
I think Greg may have fixed the 1.3 issue, but the last change I can see in the codebase is in March 2016 and frankly I just don’t care anymore. On the bright side, it looks like there’s a half-decent competitor that people who want an admin can use3. Also, the Meteor Development Group looks like it’s less interested in Meteor and focusing on GraphQL tools these days, so maybe nobody needs this. On the bright side, 880 stars on Github, so that’s cool!
What have we learned?
…one more thing
I leave you with the contributions over time graph, which tells the whole story, but with graphics.